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I.

A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case.
Appellant, Antranick Harrentsian ("HaiTentsian"), filed suit against Respondents, Frank

and Gennieve Hill (collectively "Hills"), requesting from the District Court, inter alia,
(i) enforcement of a constructive trust upon funds loaned to the Hills from their daughter, Sarah

Correa ("Sarah"), and used by the Hills to purchase real prope1iy situated in Ada County with the
common address of 419 N. 191h Street, Boise, Idaho 83702 (hereinafter "Prope1iy"); and (ii) an
order for the Hills to convey title to the subject Prope1iy to Harrentsian. (R. Vol. 1, pp. 4 - 8).
After the Hills purchased the Prope1iy, they made substantial improvements thereon with
their own funds, separate and apaii from the monies loaned to them by Sarah. (Tr., Vol. 1, p. 64,
L. 21 - p. 89, L. 24). Harrentsian contends that the Hills are not entitled to reimbursement for

the value of improvements made to the Property because they allegedly knowingly accepted
money their daughter had "stolen" from him to purchase the same. (R. Vol. 1, p. 7). After a
court trial was heard in this matter, the District Court ultimately found the Hills' testimony
credible, finding that they did not know the funds loaned to them by Sarah were wrongfully
obtained before purchasing the Property or making the improvements. (R. Vol. 1, pp. 77, 80).
As such, the District Court held that to transfer the Prope1iy to Harrentsian without recognizing
the improvements and contributions the Hills made to the Property would be inequitable.
(R. Vol. I, p. 80). The District Cami then ordered that the Hills were entitled to an equitable lien

against the Prope1iy in the amount of $33,689.08. Id. · In so doing, the District Court permitted

Harrentsian 180 days from entry of judgment to satisfy the lien after which the Hills could
commence proceeding to foreclose their lien upon the Prope1iy. (R. Vol. 1, p. 81).
B.

Brief Statement of the Facts and Course of the Proceedings.
1.

Background.

The Hills are the parents of Sarah. (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 57, LL 11 - 13 ). Sarah is the exgirlfriend and mother of two of Harrentsian' s children.

(R. Vol. I, pp. 4, 10).

In 2008,

HaiTentsian wrote three (3) separate checks to Sarah totaling $400,000.00. (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 48,
L. 16 - p. 49., L. 25). At the time Harrentsian wrote these checks to Sarah, he had been named
in a lawsuit. (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 50, LL 1 - 12). Curiously, not once in this litigation has Harrentsian
articulated the reason(s) for transferring these funds to Sarah other than to loosely throw out that
Sarah had "taken" or "stolen" the funds even though it is undisputed that he personally wrote the
checks out to her. (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 48, LL 16 - p. 49, LL 25). Subsequent to Harrentsian writing
these checks to Sarah, she left him for a final time in 2009 following an incident of domestic
violence wherein a restraining order was thereafter issued against Harrentsian. (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 95,
LL 5 - 14; p. 98, LL 22

25}

In July 2009, Sarah loaned the Hills $101,500.00 which was comprised of a p01iion of the
funds transferred from Harrentsian to Sarah. (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 58, L. 6

p. 59, L. 20). Of these

funds, $96,000.00 was used by the Hills to purchase the Property at a trustee's sale on or about
October 27, 2009. (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 59, LL 4 - 6). Thereafter, the Hills made improvements to the
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Property with their own funds in the sum of $39,189.08, funds not connected in any way to the
loan from Sarah. 1 (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 64, L. 21 - p. 89, L. 25).
In 2011, Respondent, Gennieve Hill, attended portions of the California trial against
Sarah for safety reasons related to the then existing restraining order against Harrentsian, but was
in and out during the day as a result of various tasks relating to her employment. (Tr. Vol. 1,
p. 63, LL 2

25). While the Hills generally understood at some point in time that Sarah had

been sued in California by Harrentsian eventually resulting in a judgment against Sarah, they did
not know the nature of any "constructive trust funds" or the specific findings and rulings
rendered by the California Comi prior to the time they made improvements. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 64,
LL 1 - 20).

In fact, Ms. Hill testified at trial that she had never even heard of the phrase

"constructive trust" until after the instant litigation was commenced. Id Further, Han-entsian
testified at trial that he himself had no personal knowledge with regards to the reason(s) Sarah
provided the Hills with the funds to purchase the Prope1iy "Other than what they [Hills] have
stated .... " (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 52, LL 20 - 25).
2.

The Lawsuit.

Harrentsian filed suit against the Hills on January 5, 2015. (R. Vol. 1, pp. 4

8). The

Hills filed an answer together with affirmative defenses on February 6, 2015. (R. Vol. I, pp. 913 ). From the inception of this lawsuit, the Hills have not taken the position that Harrentsian is
not entitled to the funds lent them from Sarah ($101,500.00).

1

However, Harrentsian, not

Of the $101,500.00 loaned to the Hills, $5,500.00 was spent by the Hills for debts not
associated with the Prope1iy for which the District Court reduced the amount of the Hills'
equitablelien($39,189.08-$5,500.00+$33,689.08)(Tr. Vol.1,p.104,Ll.19-p.105,Ll. 8).
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satisfied with just the monies that are traceable to the loan from Sarah to the Hills as constructive
trust funds, sought to have title to the subject Property conveyed to him in whole without more.
(R. Vol. 1, p. 8).

On April 6, 2015, Harrentsian moved for summary judgment which was opposed, in part,
by the Hills. (R. Vol. 1, pp. 14 - 23; pp. 40 - 48). The Hills did not contest ce1iain facts which
were ultimately reduced into the District Court's Order Re: Plaintiffs Motion for Summary
Judgment ("Summary Judgment Order") as follows:
1.

Frank and Gennieve Hill are the parents of Sarah.

2.

Sarah is the ex-girlfriend of Harrentsian and mother of two of his children.

3.

Harrentsian wrote three checks to Sarah totaling $400,000.00 in 2008.

4.

Sarah wrote checks out to Gennieve Hill in July 2009 totaling $101,500.00. From

these funds, Ms. Hill, who at the time was residing in California, on or around October 27, 2009
transferred $104,000.00 to the account of her sister, Yvette Bruce, who resided in Idaho.
5.

That on or about October 27, 2009, the Prope1iy was acquired at a trustee's sale

for $96,000.00 after the Hills were the highest bidders.
6.

The subject Property is cmTently titled in the Hills' names.

(R. Vol. 1, pp. 72 - 74). However, the Hills did dispute (i) whether the improvements made to
the subject real Property by them were made in good faith; and (ii) whether HmTentsian would be
unjustly enriched by receiving the whole of the Property without compensating the Hills for the
improvements made thereon.· Id. These findings and/or rulings were also made by the District
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Court in the Summary Judgment Order which denied, in part, Hanentsian's Motion for Summary
Judgment. Id. It was these central issues that were tried to the District Court on June 22, 2015.
At trial in this matter, Hanentsian called only one witness in his case-in-chief - himself.
(Tr. Vol. 1, p. 15, L. 22 - p. 55 L. 14). He immediately launched into attempting to introduce
non-authenticated and/or uncertified documents into evidence relating to the California lawsuit
as well as Sarah's bankruptcy proceedings in an attempt to impute knowledge Sarah had to the
Hills. Id. The trial exhibits HaiTentsian sought to be admitted at trial were (i) not disclosed in
discovery although requested by the Hills, and (ii) were inadmissible hearsay and/or not relevant
to the issues at trial in this matter.
Ultimately, the District Court believed the credibility of the Hills and their understanding
of where and how the monies loaned to them by their daughter came into her hands. (R. Vol. 1,
pp. 77, 80).

In essence, Hanentsian's frustration on appeal stems from the District Comi's

unwillingness to simply impute to the Hills any findings of wrongdoing by the California Court
against Sarah.
On August 3, 2015, the District Court issued its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law. (R. Vol. 1, pp. 75 - 82). On September 14, 2015, the Judgment was entered which
included the following:
1.

That the Hills forthwith execute and deliver to Harrentsian a deed transferring the

Hills' interest in and to the Property to Harrentsian;

2:

Imposing an equitable lien in the sum of $33,689.08 upon the Property in favor of

the Hills;
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3.

Requiring Harrentsian to pay the Hills $33,689.08 no more than 180 days from

entry of the Judgment, and that if said monies were not paid, the Hills could commence
foreclosure proceeding upon their equitable lien;
4.

Requiring the Hills to assign and/or transfer to Harrentsian any leases and security

deposits relating to the Property; and
5.

Holding that any and all rents attributable to the Property as of August 3, 2015

and thereafter belong to Harrentsian.
Harrentsian filed his Notice of Appeal on October 5, 2015.
(R. Vol. 1, pp. 83 - 85).

C.

Standard of Review.
1.

Findings of Fact By Trial Courts.

When reviewing a trial comi's conclusions following a bench trial, this Court's review is
limited to ascertaining whether the evidence supports the findings of fact, and whether the
findings support the conclusions of law. Vreeken v. Lockwood Eng'g, B. V, 148 Idaho 89, 108,
218 P .3d 1150, 1169 (2009). Further, "Since it is the province of the trial court to weigh
conflicting evidence and testimony and to judge the credibility of witnesses, this Comi will
liberally construe the trial comi's findings of fact in favor of the judgment entered." Borah v.

McCandless, 147 Idaho 73, 77, 205 P.3d 1209, 1213 (2009). Findings of fact made by the trial
court are not to be set aside unless its findings are clearly erroneous. Id. "If the trial court based
its findings on substantial evidence, even if the evidence is conflicting, this Court will not ·
ove1iurn those findings on appeal." Borah, 147 Idaho at 77, 205 P.3d at 1213. Moreover, this
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Court does not substitute its view of the facts for that of the trial court. Ransom v. Topaz Mktg.,
L.P., 143 Idaho 641,643, 152 P.3d 2, 4 (2006). However, this Court can exercise free review

over matters oflaw. Borah, 147 Idaho at 77,205 P.3d at 1213.
2.

Evidentiary Rulings.

"This Court reviews challenges to a trial comi's evidentiary ruling under the abuse of
discretion standard." Perry v. Magic Valley Reg'! Med. Ctr., 134 Idaho 46, 50, 995 P.2d 816,
820 (2000).

"These include challenges to a trial court's decision to admit or exclude

documentary and/or testimonial evidence." Vreeken, 148 Idaho at 108,218 P.3d at 1169. "En-or
is disregarded unless the ruling is a manifest abuse of the trial court's discretion and affects a
substantial right of the paiiy." Perry, 134 Idaho at 51, 995 P.2d at 821. In determining whether
or not there has been an abuse of discretion, this Court has applied the three following factors:
(1) whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the trial
court acted within the boundaries of this discretion and consistent with the legal standards
applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (3) whether the trial court reached its
decision by an exercise of reason. McKim v. Horner, 143 Idaho 568, 571, 149 P.3d 843, 846
(2006).
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II.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

In his briefing, HaITentsian states the issues on appeal as follows:
A. Did the district court eIT in characterizing the Respondents as "innocent
recipients of a benefit" as recognized in the Restatement (Third) of Restitution
and Unjust Enrichment §65"?
B. Did the district court err by failing to recognize that the Respondents received
notice of the underlying restitution claim when Defendant Gennieve Hill
attended the trial between the Plaintiff and Sarah Correa on March 24, 2011?
C. Did the district comi CIT by finding that the money provided to the
Respondents by their daughter (Sarah CoITea) was a loan?

D. Did the district court eIT by finding that all of the real property improvements
made by the Respondents were completed before the Respondents "were on
notice that the loan they received from their daughter was made with trust
funds"?
E. [Appellant's "G"] Did the district court CIT by giving the Appellant only 180
days from entry of judgment to satisfy the district court imposed equitable
lien?
F. [Appellant's "H"] Did the district court abuse its discretion in excluding the
Appellant's trial exhibits as a sanction for discovery violations?
(Appellant's Brief, p. 11.)
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III.

ADDITIONAL ISSUE ON APPEAL

Fmiher, the Hills request attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rules 40
and 41 and Idaho Code § 12-121.
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IV.

ARGUMENT

Although Ha1Tentsian sets forth six issues on appeal in his briefing, the Hills submit that
the issues can be fairly condensed to three questions:
(1)

Were the District Cami's findings that the Hills were not aware of the nature of

the trust funds at the time they purchased the Property and made improvements thereon clearly
erroneous?
(2)

Did the District Court abuse its discretion by excluding Harrentsian's trial

exhibits for failure to disclose the same to the Hills prior to the day of trial?
(3)

Was it inequitable for the District Court to allow HaITentsian six months to satisfy

the equitable lien?
A.

The District Court's Findings That The Hills Were Not Aware Of The Nature Of The
Trust Funds When They Purchased The Property And Made Improvements Was
Supported By Substantial, Competent Evidence.
Substantial and competent evidence supports the District Court's findings that the Hills

were not on notice regarding the nature of the trust funds when the Property was purchased and
when the Hills made improvements thereon.
1.

The California trial did not put the Hills on notice.

The fact that the Hills were aware of HaITentsian's California lawsuit against Sarah and
that she had later lost the case, did not place the Hills on notice of the nature of the trust funds.
In support of his argument that the Hills were on notice of the nature of the trust funds,
Harrentsian fixates on Ms. Hill's knowledge of his· California lawsuit and her pai1ial attendance
at the trial which took place some 17 months after the Hills purchased the Property. Harrentsian
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then cherry picks a snippet of Ms. Hill's trial testimony that she learned three or four weeks later
that Sarah had lost the case. (Appellant's Brief, p. 13.) Harrentsian then inco1Tectly concludes
that the District Court erred by "ignoring the admission of Respondent Gennieve Hill as to when
she had knowledge that the funds were wrongfully obtained."

Id.

However, Hmi-entsian

oppo1iunely omits Ms. Hill's follow-up trial testimony that more aptly focuses in on her
understanding of the nature of the trust funds as follows:

Q.

Did you ever see a copy of any tentative statement of decision from the
California Comi?

A.

I did not.

Q.

Did you ever see a copy of the California judgment that was later entered?

A.

I did not.

Q.

Ms. Hill, have you ever heard the phrase "constructive trust" before?

A.

Only recently when you explained it to me.

Q.

Was it after this particular lawsuit was initiated by the plaintiff?

A.

Yes, it was.

(Tr. Vol. 1, p. 64, LI. 7 - 20).
When asked about her attendance at the California trial, Ms. Hill testified regm-ding the
reasons and circumstances of her attendance.
Q.

Did you attend a trial in California wherein the plaintiff was a named
plaintiff and your daughter was a named defendant?

A.

Yes, I did attend.

Q.

Why did you attend?
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A.

I attended because my daughter had a retraining [sic] order for domestic
violence against Mr. Harrentsian, and I attended to
just because I
wanted her to feel safe.

Q.

Did you -- were you present for the entire trial?

A.

I was not.

Q.

Why is that?

A.

Because I was a regional manager that oversaw a multimillion dollar retail
operation, and I was distracted and I was in and out of the courtroom.

Q.

Did you at any point hear your daughter testify in that trial about anything
about just holding the funds for the plaintiff?

A.

I did not.

Q.

Anything about that it was not a gift from the plaintiff?

A.

I did not.

(Tr. Vol. 1, p. 63, LL 2 - 25).
In explaining how she and her husband purchased the Property and her understanding of
how Sarah had obtained the money for the loan to them, Ms. Hill testified:

Q.

How did you obtain the funds to purchase it at the trustee sale?

A.

We borrowed those funds from my daughter, Sarah.

Q.

Can you describe generally for the Court what the terms of the loan was?

A.

Yes. The te1ms of that were that I would borrow the money and I would
fix up the prope1iy because it was a dilapidated prope1iy, and then I would
pay her back.

[Objection by Harrentsian and ruling by the Comi].
Q.

Was this a verbal agreement?

A.

Yes, it was.
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Q.

My understanding was that Mr. Harrentsian gave her those funds. He
gave her those funds to keep her under his thumb at his prope1iy. There
was domestic violence in this situation.

[Objection by Hanentsian and ruling by the Court]

Q.

What is your understanding on how you received those funds to purchase
the property at the trustee sale?

A.

My understanding that those -- that those funds were a gift to my daughter.

Q.

Did your daughter ever tell you that she was just holding the money for
the plaintiff?

A.

Never.

Q.

Did she ever convey in any way that that money was not hers to lend to
you?

A.

She did not.

[Objection by Han-entsian and ruling by the Court]
Q.

Did you know or have any reason to know that your daughter got these
funds illegally or wrongfully from the plaintiff?

A.

I did not.

Q.

Did it seem a little bit odd that Ms. Correa obtained this amount of funds
from the Plaintiff?

A.

It did not seem odd because Mr. Harrentsian owned two mortgage
companies, he owns several properties, and he consistently talked about all
the money he had.

[Objection by Harrentsian and ruling by the Court]
Q.

Were you, Ms. Hill, involved in any way from obtaining the funds directly
from the plaintiff?

A.

I was not.

(Tr. Vol. 1, p. 59, L. 11 -p. 62, L. 18).
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On cross-examination, Harrentsian pressed Ms. Hill regarding the circumstances
surrounding her understanding about why Harrentsian gave Sarah the $400,000.00.

Q.

You knew back in 2011 that there was an issue with those funds -correct? -- the $400,000 that Ms. Correa had received from me, correct?

A.

I know that you sued her in 2011.

Q.

So you did know that. Did you inquire any further as to why Ms. Correa
owed -- Ms. Correa was being sued for $400,000 to me?

A.

She already told -- I told you that she said that you gave her the money to
stay -- so she could stay in your home.

Q.

That I gave her the money so that she could stay in my home? And you
didn't inquire any fu1iher? That was an acceptable reason for you?

A.

I know that you wanted to keep your thumb and your hold over my
daughter, so I took her at face value.

Q.

Now, how would giving her $400,000 keep my thumb over her?

A.

Because you wanted her to stay in your home?

Q.

How would that keep her in my home?

A.

Because she had left you once.

Q.

How would giving her $400,000 --

A.

And she came back. She left you once.

Q.

How would giving her $400,000 keep her from doing anything?

A.

I am telling you what she told me.

Q.

I'm asking you, in your opinion, how is $400,000 as a gift keep somebody

A.

I don't have an opinion. I just know what Sarah told me.

(Tr. Vol. 1, p. 115, L. 12 - p. 116, L. 21).
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Consistent with Ms. Hill's testimony, Mr. Hill also testified at trial that he had no
knowledge of any illegal or wrongful conduct on behalf of Sarah relating to the $400,000.00. He
further testified that he was not involved at all regarding the loan of the $101,500.00 from Sarah
to purchase the Prope1iy. (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 115, L. 12-p. 116, L. 21).

In light of the foregoing trial testimony, Han-entsian argues that "Clearly, the district
court committed e1Tor by ignoring Respondent Gennieve Hill's admissions that she knew, prior
to the California Case trial, about the issues involving the money her daughter gave her, and that
she knew the outcome of said trial three or four weeks after the California Case trial date of
March 24, 2011." (Appellant's Brief, p. 11.)
While Ms. Hill later knew at some point in time that Sarah was being sued by Harrentsian
for return of the $400,000.00, certainly it wasn't required of Ms. Hill to further inquire and delve
into the exact nature and legal theories pled by HaiTentsian, i.e., constructive trust, when she
herself hadn't even heard of the phrase "constructive trust" until after Ha1Tentsian filed the
instant lawsuit in 2015. (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 64, LL 14

20). Understanding the legal significance of

equitable theories such as constructive trust and tracing can be difficult concepts for those
working within the legal field, let alone a lay person. Ha1Tentsian goes too far in arguing that the
Hills were or should have been charged with notice of the nature of the constructive funds by
vi1iue of knowing Sarah had been sued and that she later lost the case. The District Court was in
the best position to make this call and did not err in this regard.
The District Court made a significant distinction that Hairentsian has yet to either grasp
or accept, to wit:
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Defendants concede, at [sic] the Court finds, that the Plaintiffs funds in the hands
of Sarah CoITea were held in constructive trust. This is not the equivalent of
Defendant's (sic] agreeing they were aware of the trust nature of the funds at the
time the loan was made by Ms. Correa. Ms. Correa did not obtain the funds by
fraud or deceit. They were voluntarily transferred to her by Plaintiff. Under the
circumstances of this case, knowledge that the funds for the loan originated with
Plaintiff is not the equivalent of knowledge that the funds were wron2:fullv
withheld by Ms. C01Tea and subject to a trust.

(R. Vol. I, p. 78) (emphasis added).
The District Comi, in its role as fact finder and whose role it is to determine witness
credibility during a bench trial, found the following:
Gennieve Hill testified that she was unaware at the time the funds were received
from Ms. C01Tea that Ms. Correa had wrongfully obtained and held the funds in
an as yet undeclared constructive trust. The Comi finds this testimony credible.
Defendant Gennieve Hill was aware in 2009 that Plaintiff had given a large sum
of money to Ms. C01Tea. This was explained to her by Ms. Correa as being a gift.
Ms. Correa was living with Plaintiff at the time in a romantic relationship that
included two children born of the relationship. Defendant Gennieve Hill believed
Plaintiff to be a wealthy man because he owned two mo1igage companies and
talked about how much money he had.
Defendant Frank Hill testified that he was unaware the money obtained from his
daughter, Ms. CoITea, was held by his daughter wrongfully. He fmiher testified
that he was not involved in obtaining the money from Ms. Correa, but that was
between his wife and their daughter. The Comi finds this testimony credible.
(R. Vol. I, p. 77) ( emphasis added).
In the case at bar, the Hills fully understood that the $101,500.00 Sarah loaned them
came from Hanentsian. They understood and believed that Harrentsian had a lot of money
because he in fact did have this kind of money that he transferred to Sarah and that it did not
seem beyond Harrentsian to offer Sarah a substantial amount of money so that she would not
leave him again. Accordingly, the District Court, in its sound discretion, did not believe the Hills
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needed to inquire even fmiher into the source and reasons for the transfer of funds from
Hanentsian to Sarah. HmTentsian is simply inviting this Comi to second guess the District Comi
on conflicting evidence at trial.
Because the District Court's findings of fact support its conclusions of law, it was not
error for the District Court to impress an equitable lien against the Prope1iy for the improvements
made by the Hills.

Accordingly, the District Court's findings and conclusions should be

affirmed on appeal.
2.

Ms. Hill did not know that Harrentsian did not gift the money to Ms. Conea.

Harrentsian argues that Ms. Hill knew the money given to Sarah was not a gift to her
from him because (i) he testified at the California trial that the money he gave to Sarah was not a
gift, and (ii) during his California trial testimony he witnessed, while asking and answering
himself questions on the stand like he did in this litigation, Ms. Hill was present for the duration
of his testimony. (Appellant's Brief, p. 16).
However, as set forth above, Ms. Hill testified in this case that she was in and out of the
California comiroom and did not hear anything at the California trial about the money from
Harrentsian to Sarah not being a gift from him. (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 63, LL 2 - 25). The District Comi
was well within its right to believe Ms. Hill's testimony even though Harrentsian offered
conflicting and opportunistic testimony. Borah, 147 Idaho at 77, 205 P.3d at 1213. ("[E]ven if
the evidence is conflicting, this Court will not overturn those findings on appeal.")

Put

differently, just because Harrentsian says something is so, does not necessarily make it so.
Certainly, if the District Court had believed Harrentsian's trial testimony on this point, this
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reviewing Court could and rightfully so should uphold the District Cami's determination of
witness credibility.

As such, the District Court has substantial and competent evidence to

determine that the Hills did not have knowledge that the money given to Sarah was a gift from
HaiTentsian. Again, Harrentsian is merely second-guessing the District Court on conflicting
evidence.
3.

HaiTentsian' s argument that the Hills "are not responsible for their own unjust
enrichment" is misplaced.

HaITentsian' s argument that the Hills are responsible for their own unjust enrichment is
confusing and misplaced. The District Comi found that it would be "inequitable to require
transfer of the property without accounting for the contribution Defendants made to the
property." (R. Vol. 1, p. 80). Accordingly, it was Harrentsian that was unjustly enriched, not the
Hills. Moreover, because Harrentsian's argument on this point is premised on the notion that the
Hills were on notice of the nature of the constructive trust funds when they purchased the
Property and made improvements, which for reasons outlined above was not the case, his
argument on this point fails as well.
4.

Under the circumstances, the District Court did not err in finding that Ha1Tentsian
had been unjustly enriched.

HaITentsian next argues that he would not have been unjustly enriched by receiving the
whole of the Property without accounting for the improvements made to it. (Appellant's Brief,
p. 17). As recognized by the District Court, "In equity proceedings a district judge has a wide
discretion in exercising authority necessary to protect all interests." In re Receivership of Great

18

W Beet Sugar Co., 22 Idaho 328, 125 P. 799, 801 (1912); Cf Chatterton v. Luker, 66 Idaho
242, 158 P.2d 809 (1945).
The District Cami made the following findings:
(1)

The Hills spent $39,189.08 in repairing and improving the Property and that said

improvements were reasonable and necessary and increased its value. (R. Vol. 1, p. 77).
(2)

In addition to money spent, Frank Hill performed labor in the repair and

improvements of the Property. Id
(3)

The Property had a value at the time of trial of$165,000.00 to $175,000.00. Id

(4)

That the difference between the sum of the improvements plus the purchase price

($135,189.08) and the current value of the Prope1iy is attributable to the rise in the market since
it was purchased. (R. Vol. 1, pp. 77 - 78).
Using the conservative value of the Prope1iy ($165,000.00), Harrentsian is receiving an
increase of $29,810.92 by being deeded the Property (after deducting the equitable lien of
$33,689.08). Using the higher value of $175,000.00, he is receiving an increase of $39,810.92.
Accordingly, the District Court did in fact allow for Harrentsian to receive the appreciation of the
Property attributable to the rise in the market. Moreover, the District Court only allowed an
equitable lien in favor of the Hills strictly dollar-for-dollar for the money they spent of their own
money (less the $5,500.00 spent for items not related to improvements of the Property, supra),
and not for increase in the market value of the home that may arguably have been associated
with the improvements made (i.e., $35,000.00 in updates to a home may increase the fair market
value by $45,000.00 simply by vi1iue of the improvements).
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Because the District Court found that the Hills were unaware of the nature of the
constructive trust funds until after the improvements were made, coupled with Hanentsian
capturing the increase of the Property's value attributable to the market, it was not enor for the
District Court, in exercising its wide discretion in equity proceedings, to order transfer of the
Prope1iy to Hanentsian and impress upon the Property an equitable lien in favor of the Hills.
(R. Vol., 1, p. 80).
B.

The District Comi Did Not En In Determining The Money From Sarah To The Hills Was
A Loan.
In an attempt to muddy the waters because he simply does not agree with the District

Court's finding that the Hills purchased and made improvements to the Prope1iy before learning
of the nature of the trust funds, Hanentsian resorts to choice of law and bankruptcy arguments
that are not dispositive of the District Comi's findings and conclusions. At best these arguments
are an effo1i by him to have this Comi look at or reexamine evidence that either was rejected by
the Comi or completely absent in the record below.
1.

No "Mortgage" exists.

Harrentsian argues that the funds transferred to the Hills was a gift and not a loan because
under California law a "mortgage" can be created, renewed, or extended, only by writing.
(Appellant's Brief, p. 20).

Assuming arguendo that California law did apply, Hanentsian's

argument fails nonetheless. A "mortgage" as defined by California statute states:
(a) A mortgage is a contract by which specific property, including an estate for
years in real property, is hypothecated for the performance of an act, without the
necessity of a change in possession.
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(b) For purposes of Sections 2924 to 2924h, inclusive, "mortgage" also means any
security devise or instrument, other than a deed of trust, that confers a power of
sale affecting real property or an estate for years therein, to be exercised after
breach of the obligation, including a real property sales contract, as defined in
Section 2985, which contains such a provision.
California Civil Code Section 2920.
Only on appeal has Harrentsian made the argument that there was a "m01igage" as
defined under California law that would necessitate a writing. There is no evidence in the record
below that the loan to the Hills was secured by any property at all-real or personal.

The

District Comi found as follows:
The Comi finds the transfer was a loan, not a gift. At the time the money was
transferred, it was intended that the money would be repaid to Ms. C01Tea at some
point. The Court infers from the circumstances that the loan, like many
transactions between parents and children, was vague or uncertain in many of its
tenns. There was no stated interest rate and no exact due date. The loan was to
be repaid upon resale of the house.
(R. Vol. 1, pp. 76-77).

From these findings, the District Court concluded that "The fact that some terms of the
loan were indefinite does not render the transaction a gift." (R. Vol. 1, p. 79). Even Harrentsian
himself testified at trial that he had no personal knowledge as to the reasons why Sarah gave the
Hills the money to purchase the Prope1iy. (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 52, LL 20 - 25). Now on appeal he
creates out of thin air an imaginary mortgage associated with the loan in order to argue that the
District Court erred in finding the transaction a gift opposed to a loan. Because the record below
is entirely lacking as to any evidence or argument that a mortgage existed in conjunction with the
loan from Sarah to the Hills (because none existed), Harrentsian's argument is without merit.
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2.

Sarah's Bankruptcy.

First, the District Court denied the admission of any bankruptcy papers relating to Sarah's
bankruptcy. (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 111). As such, Harrentsian is improperly attempting to have this
Court examine evidence not admitted at trial and not relevant to the issue of whether or not the
Hills knew about the nature of the trust funds.
Notwithstanding the District Court's ruling on the inadmissibility of the bankruptcy
papers, Hanentsian goes on to conclude in his briefing that an election by him to simply enforce
the loan would have been impossible.

(Appellant's Brief, p. 20).

This he argues because

property not disclosed on an asset schedule, or otherwise administered by the time a bankruptcy
case closes, remains forever prope1iy of the bankruptcy estate. Id. (citing McCallister v. Dixon,
30 P.3d 578, 154 Idaho 891 (2013)). Not only does this argument completely miss the mark
when applying McCallister (and other related bankruptcy cases) to the facts, paiiies,
circumstances and nature of this case (i.e. the Hills are not bankruptcy debtors attempting to
assert a cause of action against a third-paiiy that they omitted as an asset in a bankruptcy
proceeding), it ignores the fact that Sarah, as a constructive trustee, only held legal title and not
an equitable interest in the trust funds. 11 U.S.C. § 541 (d) reads:
Property in which the debtor holds, as of the commencement of the case, only
legal title and not an equitable interest, such as a mortgage secured by real
prope1iy, or an interest in such a mortgage, sold by the debtor but as to which the
debtor retains legal title to service or supervise the servicing of such mortgage or
interest, becomes property of the estate under subsection (a)(l) or (2) of this
section only to the extent of the debtor's legal title to such property, but not to the
extent of any equitable interest in such prope1iy that the debtor does not hold.
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(emphasis added). Here, as HmTentsian concedes, Sarah was only a constructive trustee over the
subject trust funds and therefore only held legal title, not equitable title to the same.
Accordingly, the trust funds would not necessai·ily become "prope1iy of the bankruptcy estate
forever," and would not have been "impossible" for Harrentsian to recover as a loan from Sarah
to the Hills. (Appellant's Brief, p. 21).
The District Court's finding that the transaction between Sarah and the Hills was a loan
and not a gift is supported by substantial evidence based upon (i) Ms. Hill's testimony that the
Hills borrowed $101,500.00 with the expectation of paying it back once the Prope1iy sold, and

(ii) Harrentsian's inability to refute that the transfer was anything other than a loan. See supra,
pp. 11

12, 20). The District Court appropriately judged the credibility of the Hills' testimony

regarding both the nature of the transaction as a loan as well as their lack of knowledge regarding
the nature of the trust funds when they purchased and made improvements to the Property.
Accordingly, because HaiTentsian is second-guessing conflicting evidence, the District Court's
findings and conclusions in this regard should be affirmed on appeal.
C.

The District Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion in Excluding Harrentsian's Trial
Exhibits.
The District Court did not commit error in excluding HmTentsian's exhibits at trial. A

trial court's decision to exclude documentary evidence is reviewed under an abuse of discretion
standard. Perry, 134 Idaho at 50, 995 P .2d at 820; Vreeken, 148 Idaho at 108, 218 P .3d at 1169.
"Error is disregarded unless the ruling is a manifest abuse of the trial court's discretion and
affects a substantial right of the party." Perry, 134 Idaho at 51,995 P.2d at 821. The District
Court's ruling to exclude Harrentsian's exhibits was not an abuse of discretion, nor did it affect a
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substantial right of Han-entsian as the exhibits were otherwise inadmissible on separate
evidentiary grounds.
1.

The District Comi properly acted within its discretion in excluding HaITentsian's
trial exhibits.

The Hills served Harrentsian with discovery requests, including requests for production
of documents, on April 23, 2015.

(Tr. Vol. 1, p. 25, LL 13

14 ).

In their requests for

production, the Hills requested, inter alia, "[ a]ny and all written documents and tangible items
you anticipate using or introducing into evidence at trial in this matter."
LI. 11

(Tr. Vol. 1, p. 25,

17). Although Harrentsian served the Hills with a written response to their discovery

requests, prior to trial Harrentsian produced no documents to the Hills in response to their
request for documents HaITentsian intended to use at trial. Harrentsian' s primary objection to
this request (and all of the other requests for production), was that it was "unreasonable as a
request that plaintiff travel 540 miles (1,080 round trip) to the defense attorney's office so that
they may make copies of said document." (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 26, LI. 11 - 16). However, the specific
instructions regarding production of the documents sought by the Hills read as follows:
... you are requested, within 30 days of the date of this document was served upon
you, to permit the inspection and copy[ing] of documents and things requested
below at the offices of Stewart, Taylor and Morris, PLLC, 12550 West Explorer
Drive, Suite 100, Boise, Idaho 83713 or at such other time and place as the paiiies
agree in writing. As an alternative to producing documents for inspection and
copying, accurate, legible, and complete copies of requested documents may be
attached to your responses and served within the same time period.
(Tr., Vol. 1, p. 25, L. 18 - p. 26, L. 7) (emphasis added).
Both at trial and on appeal, Harrentsian tries to point the finger of blame at the Hills for
his misreading/misinterpretation of the Hills' instructions regarding how documents could be
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produced. (Appellant's Brief, p. 22). The District Court rejected this tactic and ruled (as to the
first exhibit Harrentsian attempted to offer into evidence):
The Court:

All right. It seems to me that the request for production
made was quite reasonable, gave quite reasonable
alternatives of simply reproducing and filing the -- or
producing and serving legible copies. It did not require, as
the only alternative, traveling 1,000 miles round trip to
deliver them.
In addition, a good faith response would have required at
least inquiry to counsel. I would have expected the same of
any attorneys involved in that.
So the lack of production of the requested exhibit and given
that today is apparently the first time that defendants have
seen the proposed exhibit, Exhibit -- admission of
Exhibit 18 -- well, let me rephrase that. Exhibit 18 will not
be admitted for failure to produce the same in discovery.

Mr. Harrentsian:

Your Honor, I object to that.

The Comt:

Just one moment, Mr. HmTentsian.
And to make it clear, I do not believe that the request for
production was so overly broad or undefined as to make it
unanswerable. It clearly asks for something that is entirely
within the control of the plaintiff, and that is copies of trial
exhibits. So that universe is defined by the exhibits that
plaintiff intends to produce at trial.

(Tr. Vol. 1, p. 27, L. 20

p. 28, L. 24).

Harrentsian continued to argue at trial that the subject document had been attached to his
summary judgment pleadings. (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 29, LI. 2 - 7). The District Court reviewed the
summary judgment filings for the purpose of notice to the Hills and their counsel regarding the
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offered exhibit and correctly found that what Harrentsian had attached to his summary judgment
papers was not in the same form as offered at trial. 2 (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 30, LL 11 - 23 ).
Over the course of the trial, Harrentsian went on to offer a few more documents into
evidence. Counsel for the Hills objected to their admission, and all of such objections were
sustained by the District Court. 3 Below is a chart of all the exhibits offered into evidence by
Harrentsian, objections by the Hills, and the District Court's rulings with c01Tesponding cites to
the record.
Exhibit
Objection
Ex. No. 18 - Tentative
Not produced in discovery
Statement of Decision (CA although requested. (Tr.,
Case) (Tr., Vol. 1, p. 16,
Vol. 1, p. 17, LL 3 - 9).
L. 19 p. 17, L. l); (Tr.,
Vol. 1, p. 17, LL 21 - 23).- - ~ - -

Rulin~ & Grounds
Objection sustained for failure to
produce in discovery although
requested. (Tr., VoL 1, p. 28, L. 6
-- p. 30, L. 25).

2

Most of the documents sought to be admitted at trial by Harrenstian were more complete
documents of partial or incomplete documents he included in his summary judgment papers.
Moreover, the Hills' legal counsel was never confident at the time that what he had been
provided by Harrentsian (via email) in his summary judgment papers was in the same form he
had filed it with the District Court as legal counsel received obviously incomplete drafts and
several piecemealed emails of memoranda, affidavits and attachments. This is not necessarily to
say Harrentsian did this intentionally, but it was nevertheless difficult for the Hills' counsel to
determine exactly what had been filed with the Court by HaiTentsian regarding summary
judgment until legal counsel had court copies made of what had been filed.
3

The Hills did not object to the admissions of the Lis Pendens Notice (Exhibit No. 19) offered
by Harrentsian at trial as it was the only complete document the Hills had prior to trial (obtained
by means other than document production by Harrentsian).
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Exhibit
No. 13 - Court
Reporter's Partial
Transcript (CA Case) (Tr.,
Vol. 1, p. 37, L. 19 - p. 38,
L. 7).

(1) Not

Ruling & Grounds
Objection sustained for failure to
produce in discovery although
although requested. (Tr., Vol. 1, p. 40,
L. 15 - p. 41, L. 17).

Ob.iection
produced

discovery

m

requested.
(2) Hearsay.
(3) Foundation.

Ex. No. 19 - Lis Pendens
Notice. (Tr., Vol. 1, p. 43,
L. 19- p. 44, L. 6).
Ex. No. 1 Order to Show
Cause, Placer County Case
CV-0025631. (Tr., Vol. 1,
p. 93, L. 13 - p. 94, L. 6).
Ex. No. 21 - Declaration of
Sarah CoITea (CA Case)
(Tr., Vol. 1, p. 95, LL 18
25).

Ex. No. 15 Sarah
Correa' s bankruptcy
documents. (Tr., Vol. 1,
p. 105, LL 14- 22).

(Tr., Vol. 1, p. 38, LL 8 - 16).
No objection. (Tr., Vol. 1,
p. 44, L. 7).
Not produced in discovery
although requested and
beyond scope of direct. (Tr.,
Vol. 1, p. 94, LL 8-15).
Not produced in discovery
although requested and
improper impeachment. (Tr.,
Vol. 1, p. 96, LL 3 - 11).

Not produced in discovery
although requested and
relevance. (Tr., Vol. 1, p.
106, Ln. 9 - 19).

Admitted. (Tr., Vol. 1, p. 44, LL 8
- 9).
Objection sustained for failure to
produce in discovery although
requested. (Tc, Vol. 1, p. 94,
L. 24 p. 95, L. 1).
Objection sustained for failure to
produce in discovery although
requested and also because it is
being offered as a statement of a
person not present in the court to
impeach the witness. (Tr., Vol. 1,
p. 96, L. 17 -p. 97, L. 1).
Objection sustained for failure to
produce in discovery although
requested. (Tr., Vol. 1, p. 109,
L.17,p.111,L.20).

After the District Court had ruled to exclude the above-identified exhibits from evidence,
Harrentsian tried an end-around by attempting to testify as to the contents of the documents from
the California litigation between Harrentsian and Sarah and Sarah's personal bankruptcy before
the Idaho bankruptcy court. A hearsay objection by the Hills' attorney was sustained by the
District Court on this proffered testimony. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 31, L. I - p. 33, L. 25). The District
Court also declined to take judicial notice of a Judgment entered by the United States
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Bankruptcy Court, District of Idaho as the Judgment was not a ce1iified copy. (Tr. Vol. l, p. 31,
24 - p. 33, L. 25).
The District Comi did not abuse its discretion in not admitting the exhibits that
Harrentsian failed to produce in discovery. The purpose of discovery and the discovery rules is
to facilitate fair and expedient pretrial fact gathering and to prevent surprise at trial. Westby v.

Schaefer, 157 Idaho 616, 623, 338 P.3d 1220, 1227 (2014). Accordingly, Idaho Rule of Civil
Procedure 3 7 gives trial courts the authority and discretion to impose sanctions upon a paiiy who
fails to timely respond to discovery requests in order to prevent those who fail to comply with
the rules from being rewarded at an opposing party's expense. The exclusion of documentary
evidence is among the sanctions a trial comi may use. See Idaho R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2) and 37(d).
Here, the District Court reached its decision within the bounds of its discretion and
consistent with legal standards applicable to the choices available to it and reached its rulings by
an exercise of reason.

The District Comi could have gone either way on these evidentiary

rulings and been well within it discretion. It took the time to review the discovery requests and
Harrentsian's responses/objections and found that (i) the request for production was reasonable
and entirely in the control of Han-entsian as to what he would utilize as trial exhibits,
(ii) provided reasonable alternatives of simply producing and serving legible copies of the
requested document (trial exhibits) with the discovery responses, and (iii) the documents in the
form presented at trial were the first time the Hills or their counsel had seen them before the day
of trial. (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 27, L. 20 - p. 28, L. 24). Because the District Court's decision was not an
abuse of its discretion, it should be affirmed on appeal.
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The excluded trial exhibits were otherwise inadmissible on separate evidentiary
grounds.
Even if this reviewing Comi somehow found that the District Court abused its discretion
in relation to the excluded documents, the District Court's exclusion of those documents should
be upheld on the basis that the e1ror was harmless because the proffered documents were
inadmissible in any event. See Perry, 134 Idaho at 51, 995 P .2d at 821 ("E1ror is disregarded
unless the ruling is a manifest abuse of the trial comi' s discretion and affects a substantial right
of the pmiy.") (emphasis added); Edged In Stone v. Nw. Power Sys., 156 Idaho 176, 181, 321
P .3d 726, 731 (2014) ("Where the lower comi reaches the correct result by an erroneous theory,

this Court will affirm the order on the correct theory."). Taking the excluded exhibits one-byone, it is clear that they were also inadmissible under the applicable Idaho Rules of Evidence.
•

Ex. No. 18 -Tentative Statement of Decision (CA Case). Harrentsian wanted to

offer this document for the purpose to show he did not have unclean hands as it related to the
California case against Sarah. (Tr. Vol, 1, p. 18, LL 15

25). Said differently, he wanted the

statement of someone other than the witness testifying at trial (Harrentsian) to prove the truth of
whether or not he had unclean hands. This is inadmissible hearsay under Idaho R. Evid. 802.
Further, Harrentsian lacked the ability to lay a proper foundation for admission of this document
from the California court and it was not a ce1iified copy as is required for self-authentication,
thus rendering it inadmissible under Idaho Rules of Evidence 901 and 902. (Ex. 18, Tentative
Statement of Decision). Finally, this document was not relevant in the case at bar because
whether or not Harrentsian had unclean hands as it related to Sarah in the context of why and
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how the funds came into her hands is iiTelevant as to the reasons why Sarah loaned a portion of
those funds to the Hills. See Idaho R. Evid. 402.

•

Ex. No. 13 - Comi Reporter's Pmiial Transcript (CA Case).

Again this is

inadmissible hearsay and irrelevant for the purposes of this case. The Hills conceded that there
was a California trial and judgment against Sarah, so Harrentsian's only purpose for offering the
pmiial trial transcript would necessarily be for purposes of hearsay or impeachment. Because the
Hills did not testify at the California trial, this partial transcript could not have been used for
impeachment against the Hills.
•

Ex. No. 1 - Order to Show Cause, Placer County Case CV-0025631. This too is

inadmissible hearsay under Idaho R. Evid. 802. Harrentsian apparently wanted to introduce this
document as to "notice of what occurred back in 2009." (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 94, LL 16 - 17). Rather
than simply asking Ms. Hill whether she had ever seen an order to show cause against Sarah
(which would go to notice of what Ms. Hill knew or didn't know), he wanted the document/order
itself admitted as evidence of what its contents were. As with Exhibit No. 18, this document was
not a ce1iified copy and therefore lacked the necessary authentication under Idaho R. Evid. 90 I
and 902. (Ex. 1, Order to Show Cause).
•

Ex. No. 21 - Declaration of Sarah Correa (CA Case). Once again inadmissible

hearsay under Idaho R. Evid. 802. Harrentsian wanted this document in as evidence "of when
Ms. Correa moved back into the defendant's home." (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 96, LL 13 - 16). Rather than
subpoena Sarah for trial testimony, he wanted her out-of-court statement used for the truth of
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when she moved back in with the Hills. Further, it was improper for Harrentsian to try and
impeach Ms. Hill's testimony with statements made by Sarah.
•

Ex. No. 15 - Sarah Correa's bankruptcy documents. Again, Harrentsian could

have easily asked Ms. Hill at trial if she was aware of what Sarah had listed in her bankruptcy
papers/schedules. Rather, he attempted to introduce into evidence some of Sarah's bankruptcy
filings for the truth of the matter of whether Sarah had listed the loan to the Hills as a debt owed
her. Again these statements in Sarah's bankruptcy schedules constituted inadmissible hearsay
under Idaho R. Evid. 802.

Additionally, the bankruptcy filings Harrentsian attempted to

introduce into evidence, which were not certified copies, lacked a proper foundation and
authentication. See Idaho R. Evid. 901 and 902. (Ex. 15, US Bankruptcy Court - voluntary
petition).
D.

The District Court Did Not Err by Providing Harrentsian with 180 Days to Satisfy the
Equitable Lien.
The District Court was well within its broad discretion to allow Harrentsian 180 days to

satisfy the equitable lien.

"In equity proceedings a district judge has a wide discretion in

exercising authority necessary to protect all interests." In re Receivership of Great W Beet

Sugar Co., 22 Idaho 328, 125 P. 799, 801 (1912); Cf Chatterton, 66 Idaho 242, 158 P.2d 809
(1945).
At trial, the Hills' expert, Court Etherington, testified that the typical marketing time for a
property similar to the subject Property would be 30 to 60 days. (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 154, LI. 8 - 13).
The District Comi recognized this in its conclusions:
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The testimony at trial suggests the property could be sold in 30 to 60 days in
today's market for that area of town. Given that the Plaintiff lives in California,
may not be familiar with the local market and may decide to keep the prope1iy
rather than sell it, the Comi will allow Plaintiff 180 days from entry of judgment
to satisfy the equitable lien. After that date, the Defendant's [sic] may commence
proceeding to foreclose their lien.
(R. Vol. 1., p. 81 ). HaITentsian cites no law or authority to support his argument that the District

Comi e1Ted in allowing six months to pay the equitable lien other than his own personal feelings
that it is just not fair. (Appellant's Brief, p. 24). The District Court's allowance of a full six
months was more than fair and equitable in light of Mr. Etherington's expert testimony that it
would only take a third of that time to market and sell the Property. In light of the District
Cami's wide discretion in equitable proceedings, it cannot be fairly said that it abused its
discretion in this regard. As such, the District Court's ruling should be affirmed.
E.

Attorney's Fees and Costs on Appeal.
The Hills request that they be awarded their costs on appeal as a matter of right upon this

Cami's determination that they are the prevailing parties. See Idaho Appellate Rule 40. They
fmiher request that they be awarded their attorney's fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Appellate
Rule 41 and LC.§ 12-121. Idaho Code§ 12-121 allows an award of"reasonable attorney's fees
to the prevailing party" if "the Comi determines that the action was brought or pursued
frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation." Benninger v. Derifield, 145 Idaho 373, 37677, 179 P.3d 336, 340-41 (2008). "An award of attorney fees under this statute 'is appropriate if
the appellant simply invites the appellate court to second-guess the trial comi on conflicting
evidence."' Id. (quoting Hogg v. Wolske, 142 Idaho 549, 559, 130 P.3d 1087, 1097 (2006)).
Similarly, an award of attorney's fees under I.C. § 12-121 is appropriate where a challenge to a
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court's exercise of discretion is brought frivolously, unreasonably and without foundation.

See, e.g., Commercial Ventures, Inc. v. Rex M & Lynn Lea Family Trust, 145 Idaho 208, 21819, 177 P.3d 955, 965-66 (2008).
HmTentsian's arguments on appeal have only asked this reviewing Court to second-guess
the District Cami's determinations based on conflicting evidence presented at trial and to brush
aside a proper exercise of the trial court's discretion without providing a reasonable basis for
doing so.

Therefore, the Hills are entitled to an award of attorney's fees on appeal under

LC.§ 12-121.
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V.

CONCLUSION

Based on the reasons set forth above, the Hills respectfully request this Court to affirm
the District Court's Judgment and award costs and attorney's fees to them on appeal.
DATED this jQ_day of February, 2016.
STEW ART TAYLOR

& MORRIS PLLC

.t

Chad E. Bernards
Attorneys for Defendants/Respondents
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the I~ day of February, 2016, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document to be served upon the following person(s) in the
following manner:
Antranick Harrentsian
8065 Dorian Way
Fair Oaks, CA 95628
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